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HALLUCINATION AS IDEOLOGY IN CINEMA
POLITOLOGISKE
STUDIER - ÅRG. 4 NR. 4 - FILM OG POLITIK -OKTOBER 2001
Schubert in Stalingrad So much has
already been written about the battle for Stalingrad, this battle is
invested with so many fantasies and symbolic meanings - when the
German troops reached the Western bank of Volga, the
"apolitical" Franz Lehar himself, the author of The Merry
Widow, Hitler's favored operetta, quickly composed "Das
Wolgalied," celebrating this achievement. Let us just recall
the two main "as if" scenarios: IF the Germans were to
break through to the East of Volga and to the Caucasus oil fields,
the Soviet Union would collapse and Germany would have won the war;
IF Erich von Manheim's deft manoeuvres were not to prevent the
collapse of the entire German front after the defeat of the 6th Army
in the Stalingrad Kessel, the Red Army would have rolled over into
Central Europe already in 1943, defeating Germany before the Allied
invasion in the Normandy, so that the whole of the continental
Europe would have been Communist... So, perhaps, the time has come
to cast a reflexive glance on the main types of the Stalingrad
narratives. There is, first, the standard German narrative: the
tragedy of the hundreds of thousands of ordinary German soldiers who
found themselves trapped in a foreign land, parts of a meaningless
expedition thousands of kilometers from their homes, suffering
carnage and Winter chill, ruthlessly exploited by their leaders for
some obscure strategic goals... Such a tragic experience is, of
course, the prisoner of false immediacy; it can only emerge if one
does NOT ask some elementary questions: what the hell were they
doing there, in a foreign country? And what about the suffering they
themselves inflicted on the Russian population while they were still
winning? Then there is, of course, the official Soviet narrative:
the "sacred" battle for the defense of the faterland, in
which common soldiers showed breathtaking courage. Here, also, (at
least) two details disturb this picture. The Soviet reports to the
military headquarters continuously refer to the mysterious
"lack of coordination between artillery and infantry" - an
euphemism for the fact that the Soviet artillery bombed its own men,
which signal the Soviet horrifying indifference towards the loss of
one's own soldiers' lives. An even more interesting detail is the
extraordinary popularity that the snipers enjoyed in the Soviet
media: snipers were Stakhanovite workers transposed onto the
battlefield; their fame reflects the Stalinist turn from
egalitarianism to competition and the praise of individual
achievements. Finally, the predominant Anglo-Saxon approach
(exemplified by the bestsellers of William Craig and Anthony Beever)
combines the objective military account with the realistic depiction
of the horror of the soldiers' daily lives: while each side is
"fairly" attributed its quota of military successes and
failures (with a strange symmetry: on both sides, the sagacious
generals were fighting not only the enemy, but also the incompetence
of their supreme commander, Hitler or Stalin), the basic mode is
that of the awe at the unspeakable suffering and the superhuman
endurance of the soldiers on both sides. So how does Jean-Jacques
Annaud's The Duel - Enemy at the Gates stand with regard to these
three narratives? It belongs to neither of them: while appropriating
the Soviet sniper myth (its hero is Wassily Zaitsev, the most famous
Stalingrad sniper), this myth is coopted into the standard Hollywood
ideology. Two features of the film are crucial here: first, its
ultimate reduction of the gigantic battle to the conflict of two
individuals testing their will and patience - all the collective
scenes are just a preparation for the duel which takes place in the
abstract space of the abandoned ruins of the no-man's-land between
the two front lines. Secondly, Zaitsev is involved in a love affair
with a woman-sniper, an American girl who joined the Russians to
take revenge on the Germans for killing her family - we thus get the
production of a couple, the second key ingredient of the Hollywood
ideology. The ultimate irony of the film is not so much that it
borrowed what was clearly a Soviet propaganda fabrication (there is,
in the original Soviet and German reports from the front, no mention
whatsoever of a duel of Zaitsev with the top German sniper); it
rather resides in the fact that this borrowing served the
"hollywoodization" of the story. The most expensive
European film of all times (200 millions DM), destined to assert
Europe against Hollywood, marks the ideological defeat, the
subordination to Hollywood. No wonder, then, that the film is really
bad - the critics at the Berlin festival were right to tear it
apart. To learn something about the Stalingrad ideology, let us
therefore turn to a totally different form of art: Hans Hotter's
outstanding 1942 recording of Schubert's Winterreise (now available
in the 2001 box of 10 CDs with historical recordings of Schubert's
Lieder). Let us risk an intentionally anachronistic reading: it is
easy to imagine German officers and soldiers listening to this
recording in the Stalingrad trenches in the cold winter of 42/43.
Does the topic of Winterreise not evoke a unique consonance with the
historical moment? Was not the whole campaign to Stalingrad a
gigantic Winterreise, where each German soldier can say for himself
the very first lines of the cycle: "I came here a stranger, /
As a stranger I depart"? Do the following lines not render
their basic experience: "Now the world is so gloomy, / The road
shrouded in snow." Here we have the endless meaningless march:
"It burns under both my feet, / Even though I walk on ice and
snow." The dream of returning home in the Spring: "I
dreamed of many-colored flowers..." The nervous waiting for the
post: "From the highroad a posthorn sounds. / Why do you leap
so high, my heart?" The shock of the morning artillery attack
with its "fiery red flames." Utterly exhausted, the
soldiers are refused even the solace of death: "Oh, merciless
inn, you turn me away?" What can one do in such a desperate
situation, but to go on with heroic persistence, closing one's ears
to the complaint of the heart, assuming the heavy burden of fate in
a world deserted by Gods? "Complaining is for fools. / Happy
through the world along / Facing wind and weather!" The obvious
counter-argument is that all this is merely a superficial parallel:
even if there is an echo of the atmosphere and emotions, they are in
each case embedded in an entirely different context: in Schubert,
the narrator wanders around in Winter because the beloved has
dropped him, while the German soldiers were on the way to Stalingrad
because of Hitler's military plans. However, it is precisely in this
Verschiebung that the elementary ideological operation consists: the
way for a German soldier to be able to endure his situation was to
avoid the reference to concrete social circumstances which would
become visible through reflection (what the hell were they doing in
Russia? what destruction did they bring to this country? what about
killing the Jews?), and, instead, to indulge in the Romantic
bemoaning of one's miserable fate, as if the large historical
catastrophe just materializes the trauma of a rejected lover. Is
this not the supreme proof of the emotional abstraction, of Hegel's
idea that emotions are abstract, an escape from the concrete network
accessible only to thinking. The double sacrifice And one is tempted
to go here even a step further: in our reading of the Winterreise,
we did not just link Schubert to a contingent later historical
catastrophy, we did not just try to imagine how this song-cycle
resonated to the embattled German soldiers in Stalingrad. What if
the link to this catastrophy enables us to read what was wrong in
the Schubertian Romantic position itself? What if the position of
the Romantic tragic hero, narcissistically focused on his own
suffering and despair, elevating them into a source of perverted
pleasure, is already in itself a fake one, an ideological screen
masking the true trauma of the larger historical reality? One should
thus accomplish the properly Hegelian gesture of projecting the
split between the authentic original and its later reading colored
by contingent circumstances back into the authentic original itself:
what at first appears the secondary distortion, a reading twisted by
the contingent external circumstances, tells us something about what
the authentic original itself not only represses, leaves out, but
had the function to repress. - This is the reason why the true
"masterpieces" of Veit Harlan, THE Nazi director, are not
his overtly political films, but his "apolitical"
melodramas from 1942-1944, especially Opfergang, undoubtedly
Harlan's masterpiece. Here is the outline of the story: Upon
returning home from the trip to the Far East around 1900, Albrecht
(Carl Raddatz), a Hamburg high society adventurer, marries his cold
blond beautiful cousin Octavia (Irene von Meyendorff), and then gets
fatally attracted by Aels, a rich Scandinavian living in a nearby
villa (Christina Soederbaum). Aels is full of life energy, she likes
to ride a horse, swim and shoot a bow, has a child from a previous
relationship, but is mysteriously ill, the shadow of death hanging
onto her. Although Octavia has one outburst of paranoiac curiosity,
she tolerates her husband's passion with a saint's patience. Towards
the film's end, both Aels and Albrecht get infected by typhus; they
are both lying in their beds, Albrecht in a hospital, Aels at home,
thinking of each other. Due to her weakness, typhus proves fatal to
Aels; the only thing that still keeps her alive is the regular
appearance of Albrecht on the path in front of her window, who stops
his horse there for a minute, waving at her. Once Albrecht is also
constrained to his hospital bed and thus unable to perform this
life-saving ritual, and Octavia learns about it from the doctor who
takes care of both Albrecht and Aels, she performs herself the
ritual for a couple of days, thus prolonging Aels's life: each day,
dressed up as Albert in order to be indistinguishable from him from
the right distance, she rides a horse past Aels's villa, stops there
at the usual place and waves at her. When the doctor tells Albrecht
of this sacrifice of his faithful wife, he discovers his full love
of her. What then follows is the ultimate fantasmatic scene: first
we see Albrecht lying in his bed, looking in the right direction,
his inner voice saying: "Aels, I have to do something that will
hurt you very much." Then follows the cut to Aels lying in her
bed, looking left, as if they are in a kind of extra-sensory
communication, and answers him: "I know it all. But where are
you, my love? Are you disappearing?" Cut to the shot of the
view from her room to the path beyond the wooden fence, on which she
sees Albrecht-Octavia on a horse, and then no one. What then follows
is the supremely condensed shot/counter-shot: on the right side of
the screen, we get the close-up of the dying Aels, and, on the left
side, the American shot of Albrecht, these two appearances
communicating. Albrecht tells Aels the big secret that he really
loves Octavia and that he is here to bid her farewell; after Aels
wishes him the best luck in his marriage, Albrecht's image
disappears, so that we see just a slightly blurred image of Aels as
an island of light on the right side of the screen, surrounded by
blue darkness. This image gets gradually more and more blurred - she
dies. In the ensuing last scene of the film, Albrecht and Octavia
ride alongside each other on the sea coast, observing the red rose
on the sand moved by waves that stands for the dead Aels who is
identified with the immense sea. The opposition of the two women,
Octavia and Aels, is more complex than it may appear: each of them
stands for a certain kind of death (and life). Octavia stands for
the aetheric-anemic life of social conventions, up to the ultimate
saintly sacrifice for her husband; in this sense, she stands for
death, for the stifling of the impulse to fully live one's life,
beyond social conventions. However, precisely as such, she is the
survivor, in contrast to Aels who stands for a different death: not
the death of the pallid saintly convention, but the death that comes
with living out one's passions without constraints. It is as if
there is something lethal in such a full immersion into life - no
wonder that Aels is from the very beginning presented as someone
over whom the shadow of death lurks. This death is not simply the
end of life, but the immersion into the eternally returning
pulsation of Life itself, symbolized by the sea waves: in her death,
Aels is transfigured into the cosmic impersonal life-substance. The
structure is here that of a double sacrifice: at one level, Aels
stands for the untamed wilderness of the life energy that has to be
sacrificed so that the "normal" couple of Albrecht and
Octavia can be reconstituted - the last shot of the film is the red
rose in the sand moved by waves, the index of the Third Thing, the
sacrificed untamed female sexuality (and it is as if part of this
sexual energy passed onto Octavia who - for the first time in the
film - is now also seen riding). At another level, of course, the
sacrifice is that of Octavia who accomplishes the supreme act of
sustaining, through her masquerade, the illusion of her husband's
fidelity to his mistress that keeps her alive. This is the supreme
"male chauvinist" fantasy: that of the mistress and wife
both sacrificing herself for each other, the wife accepting the
husband's passion for the mistress and the mistress erasing herself
out of the picture to enable the reunion of the husband and the
wife... The wife wins her husband back precisely by way of accepting
his illegitimate passion for another woman, and by even taking upon
herself his desire, by acting as him in order to help her. This
fantasy finds its ultimate expression in Richard Strauss's Der
Rosenkavalier, in the words of the Marschallin which open the final
trio: "I chose to love him in the right way, so that I would
love even his love for another!" Hallucination within
hallucination Paradoxically, if Harlan is to be believed in his
autobiography (Im Schatten meiner Filme), the source for this finale
is none other than Goebbels himself! In Rudolf Binding's story on
which Opfergang is based, it is the husband (Albrecht) who dies, and
Aels is there called "Joie," a vivacious English girl with
no preexisting mortal illness. Both Albrecht and Joie also suffer
from typhus. However, in the story, only Albrecht dies, and, in the
last moment of his life, he tells Octavia of how Joie's only little
joy that allowed her to cling to life were his regular daily
appearances in front of her villa. It is after Albrecht's death that
Octavia continues to perform this ritual, dressed up as Albrecht -
these four days are crucial for Joie's recovery. When Joie recovers,
the doctor tells her that Albrecht died four days ago; shocked, Joie
answers him that she saw Albrecht each evening performing his
ritual. While the doctor dismisses this as her hallucination, Joie
all of a sudden understands what happened... Goebbels opposed this
ending, evoking the demoralizing influence such a story about
adultery in which the husband dies may have upon the thousands of
soldiers on the front who will see the film; in response to this
criticism, Harlan turned Joie into Aels and made her fatally sick,
so that she, not the husband, dies, thus totally changing the
meaning of his wife's "sacrifice" of impersonating him for
his mistress's gaze. In the story, Octavia's sacrifice is a pure
gesture of respect for her husband's love, NOT a witty maneuver
destined to regain her husband's love. In this precise sense, the
film "pathologizes" Octavia's sacrificial gesture,
reducing a pure "disinterested" ethical act to a
"pathological" feminine subterfuge. A more detailed
analysis would have to link Opfergang to Immensee, shot in the same
year, in which Soederbaum plays a woman divided between two men: she
is passionately in love with a young composer who, although he
returns her love, leaves her to pursue his career abroad; left
alone, she marries an ordinary man also deeply in love with her.
After a couple of years, the composer returns for Summer holidays
and asks her to join him in the big city; her husband loves her so
much that, upon sensing her unhappiness in marriage, gives her the
freedom to leave him for the composer. This gesture of unconditional
devotion wins her over: she rediscovers her love for her husband and
stays with him, painfully learning that he is the stronger of the
two. The trick, of course, is that the very freedom of choice her
husband gives her makes the choice a forced one, putting her under
unbearable ethical pressure: while it is easy to leave a violently
jealous husband, it is much more difficult to leave the husband who
gives you the freedom to leave him - this freedom is the very form
of appearance of the absolute coercion to freely make the RIGHT
choice. The husband is thus strictly equivalent to Octavia in
Opfergang: the angelic being of unconditional devotion whose
acceptance of his/her partner's love for another wins him/her back.
When, after long years, her husband dies, her great love, now a
world-renowned composer, returns to her town for a concert: even
now, she rejects his offer - although she continues to love him, she
remains faithful to her dead husband... The parallel with the
literary tradition of the ethical gesture of renunciation which
persists when the obstacle is no longer here also (from Princesse de
Cleves to The Portrait Of a Lady) cannot but strike the eye: to put
it in somewhat ironic terms, the heroine of Immensee is a kind of
the "portrait of a Nazi Lady"... The falsity of this
fantasy can be discerned by a more detailed analysis of the scene of
Aels's death in Opfergang: what, exactly, is "fantasy" and
what (diegetic) "reality" in it? At one level, of course,
the appearance of Albrecht to the dying Aels is her hallucination.
It has to happen for a reason that is more paradoxical than it may
appear: so that she can die. Without the caring but sobering message
that Albrecht really loves his wife, Aels would have been condemned
to live forever as a kind of contemporary Wagnerian hero unable to
find release in death; in a paradigmatic feminine fantasy, the
awareness that her disappearance will render possible the
constitution of a Perfect Couple, she gracefully withdraws from
life, erasing herself out of the picture. At a different level,
however, one should simultaneously claim that this entire shot, i.e.
Aels and Albrecht, is Albrecht's hallucination, so that we pass from
(diegetic) reality to hallucination already when we pass from
Albrecht in his hospital bed to Aels in her bed: "Aels in her
bed hallucinating Albrecht" is in its entirety Albrecht's own
hallucination, enabling him to rescue his marriage by fantasizing
Aels's forgiving withdrawal from his life after he tells her the
bitter truth. The two fantasies are thus interwoven in a kind of
spatial warp, and this impossible fantasy of the double sacrifice
provides the only consequent solution to the male problem of being
divided between a loving wife and a loving mistress - it provides
the formula of getting out of the deadlock without betraying anyone.
Endorsing a lie The ultimate lesson of this intricate staging is
that the bitter truth (marriage will survive, Aels has to accept her
death) can only be formulated in the guise of a hallucination within
a hallucination. And, perhaps, here enters the fact that Veit Harlan
was the Nazi director, author of the two key propaganda classics,
The Jew Suess and Kolberg: does the same formal feature not hold
also for the Nazi ideology? In it, the truth can appear only as the
hallucination within the hallucination, as the way the Nazi subject
hallucinates the Jews hallucinating their anti-German plot. No
wonder that Harlan's pre-war "apolitical" masterpiece, Die
verwehten Spuren (1938), the variation on the "lady who
vanishes" motif, also focuses on the ambiguous status of
hallucination. What makes this Harlan's film so interesting is its
difference from the standard "lady vanishes" story which
also served as a model for Hitchcock's Lady Vanishes (from 1939), as
well as for Cornell Woolrich's The Phantom Lady (filmed by Robert
Siodmak in 1942) - interestingly, all of them made in the same
period. The model of all these stories is an event which allegedly
occurred during the Paris world exhibition in 1867, when a Canadian
daughter and her mother visited Paris. Feeling tired, mother went to
the hotel room, while the daughter stayed out. When she returned to
the hotel, not only her mother disappeared, but everyone even denied
her existence: what had been the mother's room was now an empty room
in which workers were repairing the walls; the hotel personal
remembered only the daughter; the ship and hotel registers showed
only her name... After a desperate search, authorities disclosed the
truth to the daughter: the mother died of plague, and in order to
avoid mass panic, they had to deny her existence. While in all other
versions (inclusive of the original story itself), our - the
spectator's or reader's - perspective is limited to that of the
young girl, Harlan strangely opted for disclosing the secret of the
mother's disappearance (plague) immediately, so that the spectator
knows the truth all the time and there is no enigma - the question
is only when and how will the daughter learn the truth. Why did he
do it? Perhaps, in order to accentuate the obvious Oedipal
background of the story: the imposition of the paternal Law erases
out of the picture the obscene sick excessive Mother, it cuts the
daughter's link with her, her "passionate attachment" to
her mother, and thus enables her to enter the "normal"
heterosexual relationship. After the mother, this Mozartean
"Queen of the Night," returns to her hotel, the daughter
goes out and engages in a heavily charged flirt with Dr. Moreau,
whom they met earlier on a street parade. Then, in one of the film's
most effective scenes, the shots of the couple-to-be making a date
across the hotel balcony and then going together to a wild partying
on the crowded street, interchange with the shots of the dying
mother, her distorted face full of sweat, desperately shouting her
daughter's name ("Serafine!") - as if the access to the
male partner is to be paid by mother's death. And, effectively, when
Serafine accepts the doctor's invitation to go out with him, we get
a cut to mother's cry "Serafine!", as if admonishing her
daughter for her transgression, for abandoning her. The second
difference concerns the ending: when Serafine learns the truth, the
prefect of the Paris police asks her to do the ultimate citizen's
sacrifice - since rumors about her mother have already started to
circulate, he implores her to sign the document confirming the lie,
stating freely that she came to Paris alone, without her mother.
After she does this, the couple of her and Dr. Moreau stays alone in
the hospital room, confessing their love to each other now that
mother is also officially erased out of the picture. (This excessive
sticking to the lie for the benefit of society points towards the
authoritarian Nazi credentials of Harlan.) The path is thus clear:
in order to be fully integrated into the symbolic space of mature
relations, the girl has to endorse publicly the lie on which social
order is based, erasing the maternal threat out of the picture - the
film is almost subversive in this admission of how the public order
has to relie on a lie. Therein resides the link and, at the same
time, the difference between the Nazi cinema universe and Hollywood:
the Nazi cinema goes further, it stages the fundamental fantasy
which sustains the existing ideologico-political order much more
directly than in Hollywood; however, this very radicality produces
an almost subversive effect of its own - the cracks in the
ideological edifice are rendered much more visible than in
Hollywood. And this censorship of its own underlying fantasy remains
fully operative even in today's Hollywood. Censorship today In
today's global multicultural establishment, curators are a kind of
artistic cannibals, cutting off, preparing and consuming the flesh
of the artists' work - it thus seems quite appropriate that, in
Ridley Scott's Hannibal, Hannibal Lecter is now a curator in
Florence. Unfortunately, Hannibal is one of the first contenders for
the worst film of the year - after seeing it, one can only ask
wistfully where was here the notorious Hollywood kulturindustrie
with its flawless rules of the viewer emotional manipulation. With
regard to the film's climactic scene (in which Hannibal opens up the
skull of the drugged FBI agent, his enemy, cuts a piece of his
brain, toasts it with truffles and offers a bite to the unfortunate
agent itself), one is tempted to surmise that perhaps, the authors
of the film itself were submitted to such a procedure by the real
Hannibal, cutting from their brain the part which regulates artistic
creativity... The only mildly interesting figure in the film is the
Italian inspector who tries to track down Hannibal, played by
Giancarlo Giannini: a strange but moving personification of the
tired, resigned European decadence. It is nonetheless this very
utter failure of the film that solicits us to ask two more general
questions concerning censorship in cinema. In the good old times of
the Hayes Code censorship, the proverbial Hollywood procedure was to
change the sad ending of the literary or dramatic source of the film
into the obligatory upbeat happy ending. With Ridley Scott's
Hannibal, the circle is in a way closed: it is Thomas Harris' novel
which ends with Hannibal Lecter and the FBI agent Clarice Sterling
living together as a couple in Buenos Aires, while the film censored
this ending, opting for a more acceptable one. CITAT: "The quid
pro quo proposed by Hannibal to Clarice is therefore: "I'll
help you if you let me eat your Dasein."" When Ridley
Scott accepted to direct Hannibal, he immediately approached Harris:
"The ending was a very touchy question, so the first thing I
did was call Tom Harris. I said I didn't quite believe it. Suddenly
it was this quantum leap from this character I thought was
incorruptible and unchangeable. It couldn't be. Those qualities were
the thing that made her the most fascinating to Hannibal. If she'd
have said yes to him, he'd have killed her."(Quoted in
"The Passions of Julianne Moore," Vanity Fair, March 2001)
What, then, is so inadmissible in this "most bizzare happy
ending in the history of popular fiction"? Is it really just
psychology, just the fact that "this resolution is completely
out of character for Clarice"? The correct answer is rather the
opposite one: in Hannibal, we are served a direct realization of
what Freud called the "fundamental fantasy": the subject's
innermost scene of desire which cannot be directly admitted. Of
course Hannibal is an object of intense libidinal investment, of a
true passionate attachment - from The Silence of the Lambs, we (and,
in the couple of Hannibal and Clarice, Clarice stands for this
"we," the common spectator, the point of identification)
love him, he is an absolute charmer. Hannibal fails precisely
because, at the novel's end, it directly realizes this fantasy which
must remain implicit - the result is thus "psychologically
unconvincing" not because it is a fake, but because it gets too
close to our fantasmatic kernel. For a girl to be devoured by the
charming-devilish paternal figure, is this not the ultimate happy
end, the mother of all happy ends, as they would have put it in
Iraq? In a closer analysis, it would also be interesting to follow
the transformations of the Hannibal figure in the three novels and
films. In The Red Dragon, the first Hannibal Lecter novel (and
Michael Mann's Manhunter, the first and still the best Hannibal
film), Hannibal is a pure asubjective monster, a machine with which
no empathy is possible. The big shift then occurs with The Silence
of the Lambs, the novel and, especially, the film: Anthony Hopkins'
much celebrated (and definitely overrated) performance ultimately
humanizes Hannibal, transforming the cold apathetic killing machine
into a charming genius of Evil. Consequently, the relationship
between Hannibal and Clarice in Lambs is changed into that of an
intense interpersonal exchange: Hannibal helps her (in catching the
serial killer "Buffalo Bill"), and what he wants in return
is that she tells him her innermost traumatic fantasies (to which
the title "silence of the lambs" refers). How not to
recall here Jacques Lacan's ironic allusion to Heidegger, when he
defines what the analyst does to his patient? - "Mange ton
Dasein!", "Eat your being-there!" In Lambs, Lecter is
thus cannibalistic not only in relationship to his victims, but also
- perhaps even more - in his relationship to Clarice: instead of
eating her flesh, he "eats her Dasein," savoring the very
fantasmatic kernel of her being, her innermost fundamental
fantasies. The quid pro quo proposed by Hannibal to Clarice is
therefore: "I'll help you if you let me eat your Dasein."
Finally, in Hannibal, we pass from the exchange of fantasies to the
direct realization of the fantasy itself - the aspect censored in
the film, in which the initial emotional link is inverted: it is not
Clarice who is fatally attracted to Hannibal, it is Hannibal himself
who "stretches his hand back," asserting his love for
Clarice by cutting off his palm. (At the film's very end, when we
already hear the police sirens approaching the house, Clarice
handcuffes Hannibal to himself to prevent his escape; instead of
cutting her palm off in order to be able to run away, he cuts off
his own, giving her the proverbial pound of flesh as the ultimate
proof of love.) There is, however, another aspect of censorship,
which is fully asserted in Hannibal. Let us turn briefly to a
totally different film, Stalker: if this film is Tarkovsky's
masterpiece, it is above all because of the direct physical impact
of its texture. The landscape of the Zone, is the post-industrial
wasteland with wild vegetation growing over abandoned factories,
concrete tunnels and railroads full of stale water and wild
overgrowth in which stray cats and dogs wander. Nature and
industrial civilization are here again overlapping, but through a
common decay - civilization in decay is in the process of again
being reclaimed (not by idealized harmonious Nature, but) by nature
in decomposition. The ultimate Tarkovskian landscape is that of a
humid nature, river or pool close to some forest, full of the debris
of human artifices (old concrete blocks or pieces of rotten metal).
The actor's faces themselves, especially Stalker's, are unique in
their blend of ordinary ruggedness, small wounds, dark or white
spots and other signs of decay, as if they were all exposed to some
poisonous chemical or radioactive substance, as well as irradiating
a fundamental naive goodness and trust. Although censorship in the
USSR was no less stringent than the infamous Hayes Code, it
nonetheless allowed a movie so bleak in its visual material that it
would never pass the Hayes Code test. Recall, as an example of
Hollywood material censorship, the representation of dying from an
illness in The Dark Victory with Bette Davis: upper-middle class
surroundings, painless death... the process is deprived of its
material inertia and transubstantiated in an ethereal reality free
of the bad smells and tastes. It was the same with slums - recall
Goldwyn's famous quip, when a reviewer complained that slums in one
of his films look too nice, without real dirt: "They better
look nice, since they costed us so much!" The Hayes Office
censorship was extremely sensitive as to this point: when slums were
depicted, they explicitly demanded that the set of the slum be
constructed so that it did not evoke real dirt and bad smell - at
the most elementary level of the sensuous materiality of the real,
censorship was thus in Hollywood much stronger than in the Soviet
Union. And, in spite of all its physical horror and disgust, this
dimension of the material inertia is also thoroughly censored in
Hannibal, which takes place in the prototypical postcard environs,
be it the center of Florence or the suburbs of Washington: Hannibal
may be eating the brain, but this brain really DOES NOT SMELL.
Therein resides the ultimate lesson of this failed film: that, in
spite of the opposite misleading impressions, the Hollywood
censorship is well and alive as ever!
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© 2001 | Copyright Tusch Design | Institut for Statskundskab ved Københavns Universitet |
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